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In this paper I argue that sexual exploitation in the doctor-patient relationship would 
be dealt with more appropriately by the law in England and Wales on the basis of a 
breach of fiduciary duty. Three different types of sexual boundary breaches are 
discussed and the particular focus is on breaches where the patient’s consent is 
obtained through inducement.  I contend that current avenues of redress do not clearly 
catch this behaviour and, moreover, they fail to capture the essence of the wrong 
committed by the doctor – the knowing breach of trust for self-gain - and the 
calculated way in which consent is induced. Finally, I demonstrate that the fiduciary 







A patient must be able to trust that their healthcare professional will provide the 
best possible care and act in their best interests… A breach of sexual boundaries 




The central argument presented in this paper is that doctors’ breaches of sexual 
boundaries would be most appropriately responded to through the recognition of 
fiduciary obligations. Whilst the argument has previously been made that sexual 
exploitation in certain relationships may be dealt with more fittingly at law on the 
basis of a breach of fiduciary duty, this claim has been made in the broader context of 
all professional relationships in which one party ‘has responsibility for the [other’s] 
emotional or psychological well-being’.2 My concern is more specific. It is centred on 
the doctor-patient relationship for three reasons.  
 
First, this professional relationship, which is so fundamental in our society, offers 
a considerable exploitative opportunity for the unscrupulous doctor. This is because of 
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not merely the significant imbalance of power, but also the unique way in which the 
relationship will readily furnish opportunities for sexual exploitation.
3
 Other 
professional relationships – such as social worker-client or solicitor-client – will 
seldom if ever do likewise, for as Archard explains, ‘[a] patient… must open herself 
up, lay herself bare, share significant confidences with her doctor.’4 In such a 
relationship that is so dependent on trust, there is clear evidence that the sexual 
exploitation of patients has a deleterious effect on their mental well-being.
5
 Moreover, 
the sexual nature of the exploitation in the unequal relationship between the doctor 
and patient serves to render especially egregious the abuse of trust.
6
 Secondly, as I 
will demonstrate, a fiduciary duty not to breach the sexual boundaries can be 
grounded in the doctor’s professional responsibilities not to breach trust or to act out 
of self-interest, and is compatible with the contemporary pro-patient autonomy model 
of the doctor-patient relationship.  
 
Thirdly, although the ethical obligation on doctors to refrain from breaching 
sexual boundaries with their patients is far from new, being traceable to the 
Hippocratic Oath,
7
 medical professionals’ adherence to this ethical imperative has 
been raising growing concern.
8
 Over the past twenty or so years, there has been a 
series of well-publicised cases in which doctors were alleged to have behaved in a 
sexualised way towards their patients. Initially, there was the Department of Health’s 
inquiry concerning GP Clifford Ayling, who was alleged to have committed indecent 
assaults on female patients over a period of thirty years.
9
 This was followed by a 
second inquiry into sexual abuse allegations made by female psychiatric patients 
against two male psychiatrists,
10
 and media coverage of allegations against GPs 
Oladapo Idowu
11
 and Benjamin Deodhar.
12
 More recently, a tribunal upheld a 
Primary Care Trust’s decision to bar GP Navin Zala from working in its area in 2012 
following allegations that he had sexually abused patients over a twenty-year period. 
He was subsequently convicted of ten counts of indecent assault and sentenced to 
eleven years imprisonment.
13
 And, at the beginning of 2014, the Fitness to Practice of 
the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service suspended Dr Srinivas Yenugula, having 
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This paper’s unique contribution lies in its detailed critical scrutiny of the synergy 
between fiduciary duties, the obligation to maintain sexual boundaries, and (the nature 
of) the doctor patient-relationship. The case for dealing with a doctor’s sexual 
misconduct through recognising fiduciary duties has previously been made by Tan.
15
 
However, whilst I reach broadly the same conclusion regarding the appropriateness of 
fiduciary law to tackle this behaviour, this paper takes forward Tan’s briefer analysis 
in a number of significant respects. First, I consider the issue of prevalence to 
demonstrate the significance of the problem. Secondly, whilst Tan focuses on battery 
as an alternative cause of action for the patient, I consider the suitability of both 
battery and negligence. Thirdly, I subject the question of whether the case for 
fiduciary obligations is made out to greater critical and analytical scrutiny. Finally, I 
draw important connections between fiduciary obligations and the contemporary 
model of the doctor-patient relationship.  
 
The paper unfolds as follows. I begin by exploring what sexual boundary 
breaches within the doctor patient relationship are and consider also their prevalence, 
before explaining why such breaches of sexual boundaries can be harmful and 
exploitative. I then differentiate between three different types of sexual boundary 
breaches. My particular focus is on breaches involving inducement. I do not address 
cases of rape or sexual assault, which would ordinarily be dealt with by the criminal 
law. Rather, I am concerned with instances where doctors engage in sexual behaviour 
with their patients when patients acquiesce, but whilst their consent might be 
questioned because they have been induced into sexual activity by the doctor, the 
question of whether their consent is invalid at law is not clear cut. Take, for instance, 
the case of cosmetic surgeon, Fabian Baez, who offered to provide a botox procedure 
for free to a patient in exchange for sexual favours.
16
 In such a case, the patient 
consents to the sexual activity; however, her only reason for so doing is to obtain the 
surgery she desires. The surgeon takes advantage of the patient, knowing that offering 
her the procedure is likely to be sufficient inducement to gain her acquiescence to 
sexual activity. Considering such wrongful and harmful breaching of the sexual 
boundaries by doctors, I explore what is available in terms of legal redress. I contend 
that the current avenues of redress do not lend themselves well to such sexual 
exploitation because it is not clear that they catch this behaviour. Moreover, they fail 
to capture the essence of the wrong committed by the doctor – his knowing breach of 
trust for self-gain, having allowed a conflict to arise between his duty to the patient 
and his self-interest - and the calculated way in which consent is induced. I thus argue 
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that these cases would be more appropriately dealt with if the law recognised a 
doctor’s liability for breach of fiduciary duty. Finally, I proceed to elucidate the way 
in which the fiduciary approach can be synthesized with the contemporary pro-patient 
autonomy model of the doctor-patient relationship.  
 
 
II. BREACHING SEXUAL BOUNDARIES IN THE DOCTOR-PATIENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
A. Nature and Prevalence of Sexual Boundary Breaches 
 
According to General Medical Council (GMC) guidance, doctors ‘must not pursue a 
sexual or improper emotional relationship with a current patient’.17 Although there is, 
therefore, no doubt that physicians have an ethical and professional obligation not to 
behave in a sexual manner with their patients, the cases I refer to in the introduction 
clearly evidence violations of this obligation.
18
 It has been noted that generally 
‘[s]exual boundary violations are discussed but not clearly defined in the professional 
literature’,19 and definitions may be inconsistent.20 There is thus a lack of clarity as to 
what exactly constitute sexual boundary breaches. The description that is most 
commonly referred to in the professional literature in the UK comes from the Council 
for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE). The CHRE’s definition is an 
expansive one, encompassing the use of words intended to be sexually arousing or 
gratifying as well as sexualised acts: 
 
A breach of sexual boundaries occurs when a healthcare professional displays 
sexualised behaviour towards a patient or carer. Sexualised behaviour is defined 





My focus in this paper is on sexualised activity since, by and large, the reported cases 
and research relate to the occurrence of physical sexual activity rather than or 
alongside the use of words.  
 
Although research data on sexual boundary breaches by physicians is limited, in 
surveys from the USA in 1986 and the Netherlands in 1992, some kind of sexual 
encounter with a patient was admitted by up to 10% of doctors.
22
 9% of 10,000 
doctors stated that they had had sexual contact with one of more patients in another 
study from the USA reported in 1992.
23
 According to Subotsky’s research in the UK, 
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nineteen of the thirty six cases against psychiatrists decided by the Professional 
Conduct Committee of the GMC between January 2000 - November 2004 related to 
sexual misconduct, leading her to conclude that ‘over this period, sexual misconduct 
was the major issue for serious professional misconduct (SPM) hearings at the GMC 
for psychiatrists’.24 However, this does not appear to apply to this period only. 
Smith’s research reveals that sexual misconduct has been a significant matter for the 
GMC for a much longer period,
25
 thereby providing a clear indication that whilst the 
professional duty not to breach sexual boundaries is strictly enforced, it is commonly 
breached. It is of interest that the reported cases and research in the area reveal a 
significant gender issue: when sexual boundary breaches occur, they tend to be 
instigated by male doctors against their female patients. One study found that where 
the respondent doctors who acknowledged sexual contact with their patients specified 





If there has been an increase in sexual boundary breaches over the last few 
decades, this has been attributed to the changing nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship brought about by the emphasis on greater informality and the end of the 
age of deference, leading to an increased likelihood that doctors may cross 
professional boundaries.
27
 Whilst ethical training could play a role in reducing the 
occurrence of sexual boundary breaches, it is notable that, according to the recent 
literature, medical professionals continue to receive little education on this matter.
28
 
Indeed, we should be cautious that the available statistics reveal a true picture of the 
actual prevalence of sexual boundary breaches. As some respondents in one study 
noted, there are numerous reasons why doctors might not admit to such breaches 
when asked to participate in surveys on prevalence, including concerns about bringing 
the profession into disrepute and the fear of legal consequences should their breaches 




B. Wrongful and Harmful: the Breach of Trust and its Effects 
 
The primary reason that physicians’ breaches of sexual boundaries are wrongful 
relates to the nature of their relationship with their patients. The doctor-patient 
relationship is a prime example of a relationship of unequal power and trust and the 
particular effects of the power imbalance and abuse of trust in the relationship are 
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heightened in the context of sexual exploitation.
30
 The obligation upon doctors to 
maintain sexual boundaries can be clearly linked to the humanity formulation of 
Kant’s second categorical imperative, the ethical responsibility to treat individuals as 
ends in themselves, rather than merely as means to an end and thereby failing to 
respect them as persons.
31
 Buchanan’s Kantian account of exploitation seems 
particularly apt here: ‘to exploit a person involves the harmful, merely instrumental 
utilization of him or his capacities, for one’s own advantage or for the sake of one’s 
own ends.’32 Although space to explore the concept of exploitation in this paper is 
limited, by this term I particularly have in mind a doctor’s utilisation of his position of 
power wrongfully to take advantage of a patient for his own ends.
33
 The doctor’s 
sexual exploitation amounts to the wrongful misuse of the patient because his treating 
of her in an exploitative manner ignores what makes her human, infringes her dignity 
and right to demand respect equal to that paid to the doctor himself, and fails to 
recognise the value of her life. Moreover, the doctor takes advantage of the power 
entrusted in him by both patient and society, prioritises his own interest, and may also 
take advantage of some weakness, vulnerability or other characteristic that enables 
him to misuse the patient, such as a drug addiction.  
 
Besides being wrongful, sexual boundary breaches by doctors can also be 
seriously harmful. Of course, sexual exploitation in any relationship can cause serious 
harm; however, in professional relationships such as that between doctor and patient, 
Koenig and Spano note that ‘[t]he result of this behavior is always devastating 
because the less powerful person experiences or re-experiences a fundamental 
violation of her or his trust, which is so essential to the professional relationship’.34 A 
comprehensive review of the existing research on the effects on patients produced for 
the CHRE in 2007 revealed that ‘[s]ymptoms include post traumatic stress disorder, 
anger, a sense of betrayal and exploitation, guilt and self-blame’.35 The Kerr/Haslam 
Inquiry Report refers to the devastating effects of the doctors’ breach of trust on their 
patients,
36
 and Ayling’s patients’ testimony revealed their inability to challenge his 
abusive behaviour: ‘I was a bit shell-shocked. His attitude was so brusque - it was so 
businesslike … You didn’t like to argue with him … I’d been brought up to trust my 
doctor.’37 In such cases and, in part, because sexual activity is such private, intimate 
behaviour, patients find it difficult to disclose. For example, the records show that 
some of Ayling’s patients felt unable to report his abusive behaviour or even discuss it 
with others.
38
 Feeling shame at being unable to avoid the sexual exploitation and 
abuse would seem to be a common response amongst patients and has been noted as 
‘a massive obstacle to healing, and to breaking the silence’.39 There is an interesting 
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question whether such a reluctance to disclose will remain following the spate of high 
profile historic sexual abuse cases that have been seen recently, and the criticism that 




C. Types of Sexual Boundary Breaches 
 
Varying behaviour falls under the umbrella term of sexual boundary breaches. As I 
see it, there are three different types of such breaches. First, Type 1 breaches occur 
where a doctor engages in sexual activity with a patient without the patient’s overt 
consent. This would include rape and sexual assault for example,
41
 and such a breach 
could occur when the patient is unconscious and thus unable to consent. As noted 
already, physicians’ sexual boundary breaches without consent can (and should) be 
dealt with by the criminal law. Secondly, there are Type 2 sexual boundary breaches, 
where a doctor’s conduct is less likely to be criminalised because the patient’s consent 
has been obtained, albeit that this consent has been improperly induced.
42
 Such 
instances of sexual exploitation manipulate patients, causing them to act against their 
better judgement,
43
 and are also clearly exploitative of their weaker positions in their 
relationships with their doctors, as the following examples demonstrate. 
 
First, a gynaecologist offers to not charge for fertility treatments in exchange for 
sex, or to ‘naturally inseminate’ a woman who desires to have a child.44 Secondly, in 
the Canadian case of Norberg v Wynrib,
45
 the patient, Laura Norberg, was addicted to 
Fiorinal, a prescription drug which she had been obtaining from numerous doctors. 
When each of these doctors refused her request for more of the drug, she approached 
Dr Wynrib. He initially gave her a prescription but realised she was addicted after she 
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made further requests for the drug. He then told her that if she was ‘good to’ him, he 
would ‘be good’ to her, the implication being that he would supply the drug in 
exchange for sexual favours. Norberg attempted to obtain further prescriptions from 
other doctors without success and desperation thus caused her to return to Dr Wynrib. 
On numerous occasions she provided him with sexual favours to gain access to 
Fiorinal. Subsequently, she went to a drug rehabilitation centre and was successful in 
overcoming her addiction. She brought claims against Dr Wynrib in battery for sexual 
assault, in negligence, and for breach of a fiduciary duty. The Supreme Court of 
Canada found in Laura Norberg’s favour, although there were differences of opinion 
as to the basis upon which her claim was successful. I discuss the Supreme Court’s 
judgment in the following section, where I am concerned with exploring potential 
legal remedies for such sexual boundary breaches involving inducement. 
 
Notably, our moral objection to such sexual boundary breaches does not only 
relate to the doctor’s violation of trust, it also concerns the way in which consent is 
procured and the doctor’s violation of an essential professional obligation. First, the 
moral objection involving the means of obtaining consent can be shown by drawing a 
parallel with our response to consent in cases of blackmail, for ‘… blackmail in the 
broad sense encompasses all actions aimed at inducing the victim to give up 
something significant, something like… sexual favors…’.46 Blackmail is, at bottom, a 
contract for silence.  The person who is blackmailed into paying hush money appears 
to consent to pay quite genuinely: he or she wants the silence. Similarly, the patient in 
the first example above gives ostensible consent because she wishes to have a child 
and a patient in Laura Norberg’s situation gives apparent consent because she wants 
the drugs, despite the fact that they may well find sex with the doctor distasteful. 
Notwithstanding the presence of seemingly genuine consent in these cases and cases 
of blackmail, we object to the way that the consent is induced; we see reason to 
question how real this consent is because there is a telling presence of exploitation.  
 
As Fletcher demonstrates in his analysis of blackmail, our objection stems from 
the fact that the blackmailer (or doctor) has created a situation in which he can exploit 
the other party’s weakness and thereby dominate the other party through blackmail or 
an inducement.
47
 Fletcher comments that ‘… the essence of… blackmail [lies in] the 
relationship of dominance implicit in taking the first step of inducing the victim to pay 
money...’.48 There could consequently be a distinction between blackmail and some 
Type 2 sexual boundary breaches, since there may be no continued relationship of 
dominance where the patient can walk away after consenting to one sexual act, such 
as where a doctor induces a patient to consent to sexual intercourse by offering to 
move them up on the waiting list for an operation, for instance. Once the operation 
has taken place, there might not be any continued weakness that the doctor can 
continue to take advantage of. However, as with blackmail, in Type 2 cases such as 
Norberg where the doctor takes advantage of a particular, continuing vulnerability 
such as a drug addiction or a long-term illness, once the patient has consented to 
provide the first sexual favour, the relationship of dominance and subordination is 
established, encouraging further sexual demands. 
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Alongside this issue of procured consent in the context of a relationship involving 
an unequal balance of power lies a powerful moral objection to such sexual boundary 
breaches based on the doctor’s violation of an essential professional obligation. As 
put by McLachlin J in Norberg v Wynrib, a doctor ‘pledge[s] himself - by the act of 
hanging out his shingle as a medical doctor and accepting [the patient] as his patient - 
to act in her best interests and not permit any conflict between his duty to act only in 
her best interests and his own interests - including his interest in sexual gratification - 
to arise.’49 This obligation on doctors to avoid permitting a conflict to arise between 
their duty to act in their patients’ best interests and their own self-interest is 
fundamental to upholding both the reputation of the medical profession and our trust 
in the profession. 
 
Finally, Type 3 sexual boundary breaches are consensual without any element 
such as inducement manipulating the patient and causing her to act against her better 
judgement. They may be initiated by the patient and are not engineered by the 
doctor’s exploitation of his more powerful position in the relationship.50 Whilst the 
patient in a Type 3 case may not feel that the trust she places in her doctor has been 
breached by consensual sexual activity, there is still a breach of the trust that the 
public places in the medical profession to maintain purely professional relationships 
with patients and thereby avoid a potential conflict between the doctor’s duty and 
self-interest. However, this breach is most appropriately dealt with through 
professional regulation.
51
 Since I am not advocating that there be some form of legal 
redress for patients in cases where consensual sexual activity absent any inducement 
takes place,
52
 Type 3 breaches will not be discussed further in this paper. 
 
 
III. EXISTING POSSIBILITIES FOR LEGAL REDRESS FOR TYPE 2 
SEXUAL BOUNDARY BREACHES 
 
Tort... can provide a remedy for a physician’s failure to provide adequate 
treatment. But only with considerable difficulty can [it] be bent to accommodate 
the wrong of a physician’s abusing his or her position to obtain sexual favours 
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If the existing law in England and Wales can effectively bring a doctor to account for 
his or her sexual exploitation of a patient in Type 2 breaches and captures the essence 
of the wrong committed, the argument that the doctor’s duties need to be seen through 
the fiduciary lens will be less persuasive. In this section, I thus explore the different 
avenues for redress which the law may offer and the limitations of these avenues 




It is possible for an aggrieved patient to bring a civil law action for battery in Type 1 
cases if the absence of consent to sexual touching is clear and there would be no need 
to establish the existence of any damage.
54
 Also, if a doctor obtains a patient’s consent 
to sexual activity through deception, this deception could vitiate consent.
55
 But it 
seems that this deception would have to mean that the patient did not consent to the 
nature and the quality of the act.
56
 Thus, turning to Type 2 breaches, a battery (under 
civil and criminal law) could occur if, for instance, the patient is induced to consent to 
sexual activity because her psychiatrist convinces her that it is medical treatment 
necessary for her recovery. Absent such deception, case law has suggested that 
consent could also be deemed less than real because of the doctor’s more powerful 
position, albeit this is in the specific context of a prison setting. In Freeman v Home 
Office,
57
 a prisoner alleged that his consent to the injection of prescribed drugs by a 
prison medical officer was not real because he was a prisoner in the defendants’ 
custody. The judge at first instance, McCowan J, noted that ‘in a prison setting, 
[where] a doctor has the power to influence a prisoner’s situation and prospects a 
court must be alive to the risk that what may appear, on the face of it, to be a real 
consent is not in fact so’. However, he found no evidence that ‘the plaintiff's capacity 
to consent was overborne or inhibited in any way’.58 The Court of Appeal dismissed 
the plaintiff’s appeal. I return to Freeman below. 
 
Looking to the Canadian jurisprudence, one of the claims Laura Norberg brought 
against Wynrib was in battery for sexual assault. Favouring this claim, La Forest J 
held, with Gonthier and Cory JJ concurring, that the notion of consent should be 
adjusted to take into account the constraint that can be placed upon freedom to 
consent, because of an imbalance of power in the parties’ relationship.59 Although this 
was not an action brought under criminal law for sexual assault, La Forest J made 
reference to the relevant section of the Canadian Criminal Code upon assault, which 
states that no consent is obtained where the complainant submits because of the 
exercise of authority.
60
 In deciding whether legally effective consent to a sexual 
assault under the tort of battery has been given, La Forest J stated that a two-step 
                                                 
54
 The doctor could also commit the offences of rape, assault by penetration, sexual assault or causing 
sexual activity under ss.1-4 of the SOA if he engages in sexual activity with a patient without her 
valid consent (see further Ost and Biggs (n 42)). However, I explore this no further in this paper since 
my concern here is considering existing avenues for redress for the patient in Type 2 cases which are 
less likely to be caught by the criminal law. 
55
 Appleton v Garrett  (1997) 34 BMLR 23 and, under the criminal law, R v Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App 
R 328 and s.76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
56
 See R v Tabassum, ibid. 
57
 Freeman v Home Office [1984] QB 524. 
58
 Ibid, 535 and 542-543. 
59
 Norberg v Wynrib (n 45) [27]. 
60
 Ibid, [35]. The relevant section of the Criminal Code is s.265(3)(d). 
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process is involved. The first step is to ascertain whether an inequality of power exists 
between the parties, the second is to determine whether exploitation has occurred. La 
Forest J held that Wynrib’s medical knowledge and his authority to prescribe drugs 
meant that an imbalance of power existed. He found that exploitation had occurred 
because Wynrib had made use of Norberg’s drug addiction, her weakness, to pursue 
his own interests. Meaningful consent, therefore, was absent.
61
 Moreover, even if it 
were accepted that there had been acquiescence, La Forest J negated a defence 




   
La Forest J’s finding that consent was absent has received academic support, with 
Grubb arguing that, in all likelihood, Norberg’s drug addiction deprived her of the 
ability to give consent to sexual activity.
63
 But this was a particular vulnerability, 
arguably capable of vitiating consent, which will not necessarily be present in other 
Type 2 cases. In such cases, we are left with the question of whether, absent such a 
vulnerability, offering an inducement in a relationship involving an imbalance of 
power can make any consent invalid. Notably, there is no equivalent criminal law 
provision regarding acquiescence in sexual activity due to an exercise of authority that 
could be looked to in this jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this, in the context of tort, 
Grubb has argued that ‘[i]t is certainly the case that the law would scrupulously 
examine the actual relationship between a doctor and patient to ensure that the 
patient’s consent is not involuntary due to undue pressure, inducements etc’, citing 
Freeman to support this.
64
 In Freeman, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the 
question of whether the prisoner had given real consent to the administration of the 
drugs ‘was essentially one of fact’, taking into account ‘the setting in which the events 
occurred’.65 This does lend strength to the suggestion that, in a case involving a sexual 
boundary breach between doctor and patient where inducement in a dependent 
relationship is present, this could be enough to vitiate the latter’s consent under tort 
law. Seemingly in contrast to Grubb, however, Allen has contended that since it was 
held that the significant influence a prison doctor exerts over an inmate was not 
enough to vitiate consent, Freeman indicates that any pressure stopping short of force 
or threats would be insufficient to make consent less than real in cases of sexual 
exploitation in professional relationships involving an unequal balance of power.
66
  
                                                 
61
 Ibid, [49].  
62
 Although see McLachlin J’s challenge to the application of this doctrine, ibid, [81]. 
63
 A Grubb, ‘Sexual Assault by Doctor: Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Taylor v McGillivray’ (1995) 3 
Med. L. R. 108, 109. A recent American case involving a doctor who prescribed female patients drugs 
to obtain their acquiescence to sexual acts, leading to a number of rape and sexual assault charges, is 
also of interest. One significant factor in this case was that the doctor over-prescribed the drugs, 
making the women dependent and then using their dependency as leverage to commit the assaults. This 
seemingly led prosecutors to conclude that any apparent consent was vitiated. See M Trimble, 
‘Midstate doctor prescribed narcotics like candy, sexually assaulted addicted patients, police say’, 
PennLive (10 February 2015) 
<http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2015/02/midstate_doctor_sexual_assault.html> accessed 
23 December 2015. The doctor’s death in November 2015 prevented the case from proceeding further. 
See M Trimble, ‘Victims will not see day in court after accused “candy doctor’s” death’ (23 November 
2015) 
<http://www.pennlive.com/news/2015/11/dr_jay_cho_court_charge_sexual.html#incart_related_stories
> accessed 23 December 2015.  
64
 Ibid, 109. 
65
 At 555, per Sir Stephen Brown LJ. 
66




I submit that Grubb’s interpretation is the most persuasive and demonstrate this 
by considering a parallel with undue influence under contract law. Grubb’s 
interpretation reflects the position under contract law that undue influence is enough 
to vitiate consent,
67
 for ‘…in each case of undue influence we are essentially 
concerned with a superior party who wrongfully provides an ordinarily free and 
rational person with what appears to be a reason for doing what the influencer 
desires’.68 Where there is evidence of overt persuasion, the case would meet the 
criteria of actual undue influence; and where things were slightly hazier the case 
would meet the criteria for presumed undue influence (provided the patient could 
show that what occurred is explicable only on the basis that it was procured by the 
exercise of undue influence rather than being readily explained by the relationship 
between the parties).
69
  Drawing a parallel with the position under contract law seems 
particularly apt because there is, in contract law, a presumed relationship of trust and 
influence between doctors and patients.
70
 Moreover, there is a strong argument that 
even though contract and tort are different branches of the civil law of obligations, 
they ought nonetheless to be harmonious. Indeed, it is notable that La Forest J made 
reference to the doctrine of undue influence in contract law in substantiating his 
finding that Norberg’s consent was absent: 
 
The doctrines of duress, undue influence, and unconscionability have arisen to 
protect the vulnerable when they are in a relationship of unequal power… on 
grounds of public policy, the legal effectiveness of certain types of contracts will 
be restricted or negated. In the same way, in certain situations, principles of public 
policy will negate the legal effectiveness of consent in the context of sexual 
assault. In particular, in certain circumstances, consent will be considered legally 
ineffective if it can be shown that there was such a disparity in the relative 





Furthermore, whilst not a case involving an action for battery and a professional 
relationship where there was an imbalance of power, Re T
72
 provides an example of a 
case where the concept of undue influence was applied in the medical law context and 
was part of the reason for the judgment that the patient’s refusal of life-sustaining 




                                                 
67
 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923. 
68
 R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence: “Impaired Consent” or “wicked exploitation”? (1996) 16 OJLS 503, 
511. See also P Birks, ‘Undue Influence as Wrongful Exploitation’ (2004) 120 LQR 34: ‘…undue 
influence consists in unconscionable exploitation of influence’ (34). 
69
 See Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge [2001] UKHL 443, [30]. 
70
 See Goldsworthy v Brickell [1987] 2 WLR 133. 
71
 Norberg v Wynrib (n 45) [28 and 34].  
72
 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 (CA). 
73
 This parallel between inducement in Type 2 cases and undue influence gives rise to the interesting 
question of whether we are more likely to assume that a patient was ‘not in a position to choose freely’ 
(n 71) because of undue influence or an inducement when she makes a choice which we would 
otherwise not have expected her to make and a choice which is, in our view, against her interests. 
Whilst I do not have the space to discuss this matter here, the refusal of a blood transfusion in Re T 
does seem to be an example of such a choice. 
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That said, it is clear that the answer to the question of whether or not consent is 
vitiated when an inducement is offered in a relationship involving an imbalance of 
power is unsettled in tort law.
74
 As La Forest J noted in Norberg v Wynrib, both the 
trial judge and the Court of Appeal found that Norberg gave voluntary consent to the 
sexual behaviour with Wynrib, and one of his fellow judges in the Supreme Court, 
Sopinka J, found that although Norberg did not wish to engage in sexual activity with 
her doctor, her capacity to consent was not affected.
75
  Moreover, in the context of 
criminal cases, it has been argued that where there is ostensible consent then it is 





What is more, although the tort of battery ‘carries connotations of intentional 
wrongdoing and harm’,77 framing the behaviour in Type 2 breaches in this way fails 
to convey the fact that the particular characteristics of the relationship between doctor 
and patient make the doctor’s behaviour especially wrongful. As noted by McLachlin 
J  in Norberg v Wynrib, ‘[i]n common with all members of society, the doctor owes 
the patient a duty not to touch him or her without his or her consent; if the doctor 
breaches this duty, he or she will have committed the tort of battery’.78 Going down 
the avenue of the tort of battery would thus reflect the doctor’s breach of this 
obligation owed by all in society, but would not encapsulate the breach of his duty to 
act in the patient’s best interests rather than his own self-interest,79 a duty premised on 
trust. Whilst it might be argued that part of the wrong inherent within a doctor’s Type 
2 breach - the violation of trust and the procuring of consent through wrongful 
exploitation of a dependent relationship - could be dealt with through an award of 
aggravated damages, this still does not address my contention that the essence of the 




Outside the intentional torts, it may be possible to bring an action against a doctor in 
certain Type 2 cases in negligence. However, whilst nothing firmly rules negligence 
out, it is not the most appropriate action for a number of reasons. An action in 
negligence would most obviously be available in cases where, in addition to the 
sexual boundaries breach, the doctor’s performance of his professional duty towards 
the patient (the provision of treatment, for instance), was below the required 
standard.
80
 The element of failing to meet the professional standard of care would be 
present in the example provided earlier of the gynaecologist who ‘naturally 
inseminates’ a patient seeking fertility services, since this would be a blatant failure to 
provide treatment in accordance with medical standards. And turning again to 
Norberg v Wynrib, Sopinka J held that Dr Wynrib was under a duty to follow 
                                                 
74
 See also Birks (n 68) 37: ‘…undue influence may be a wrong in aggravating circumstances. That is 
largely unexplored territory.’ (Emphasis added.)  
75
 Ibid, [42 and 133]. 
76
 See n 42 above and L Ellison and V Munro ‘Jury deliberations and complainant credibility in rape 
trials’ in C McGlynn and V Muno (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative 
Perspectives (Routledge: London 2010) 281. 
77
 I Kennedy, ‘The Fiduciary Relationship and its Application to Doctors’, in P Birks (ed), Wrongs and 
Remedies in the Twenty-First Century (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1986) 113. 
78
 Norberg v Wynrib (n 45) [64], per McLachlin J. 
79
 See also Tan (n 15) 252. 
80
 See also Allen (n 2) 69. 
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professional standards and that he had breached this duty, committing negligence by 
failing to attempt to help Laura Norberg overcome her addiction. In his view: 
 
While the appellant consented to the sexual encounters, she did not consent to 
the breach of duty that resulted in the continuation of her addiction… The fact 
that a patient acquiesces or agrees to a form of treatment does not absolve a 





Outwith cases where the sexual boundaries breach is related to a failure to treat the 
patient in accordance with required standards, although the professional guidance 
from the GMC makes it clear that doctors breach their professional code of conduct if 
they engage in a sexual relationship with their patients,
82
 this is unlikely to amount to 
a breach of a legal duty not to engage in sexual behaviour with patients for the 
purposes of the tort of negligence. Ordinarily, the doctor’s duty is framed in terms of 
the tasks that he undertakes and in respect of which he professes some special skill. 
And it is for this reason that a doctor’s negligence is primarily measured in terms of 
his failure to meet ‘the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing 
to have that special skill’.83  
 
One possibility is that the negligence action could be framed in terms of the 
doctor’s breach of his broader professional duty to promote the patient’s general 
health.
84
 On this approach, a breach of the sexual boundaries in Type 2 cases would 
suffice to ground a negligence claim because of the harm such a breach might cause 
to the patient’s mental health.85 There would be no need, on such analysis, to establish 
an associated failure to provide appropriate treatment to the patient. It is no objection 
that the doctor’s conduct is deliberate rather than inadvertent since negligence liability 
is ascribed on the basis of a failure to meet an expected standard of conduct, and it 
makes no difference whether this failure is attributable to a deliberate breach of duty 
or one that is accidental.
86
 But this approach relies upon an entirely novel conception 
of the legal duty owed by doctors to their patients. The professional duty may well be 
amenable to such broad construction, but the legal duty – as the quotation above 
amply testifies – is firmly tethered to the tasks undertaken in the deployment of the 
doctor’s particular, professional skills. Moreover, even if there were to be judicial 
support for extending the duty of care in negligence in this way, this would not 
necessarily help patients in Type 2 cases who, even though they have been induced to 
take part in sexual activity, have nonetheless consented to it, and may therefore face a 




A further factor which militates against the invocation of negligence law in this 
context is the fact that psychiatric harm – at least so far as that term is generally 
understood – would not be compensable in Type 2 Cases. The House of Lords has 
                                                 
81
 Norberg v Wynrib (n 45) [156]. 
82
 GMC (n 17). 
83
 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, 586, per McNair J. 
84
 See Allen (n 2) 69.  
85
 See section II.B, ibid. 
86
 See C Gearty, ‘The Place of Private Nuisance in the Modern Law of Torts’ [1989] CLJ 214, 223. 
87
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twice insisted that in order for such harm to be recoverable, a risk of physical harm to 
a primary victim must have been foreseeable.
88
 Yet in Type 2 cases which do not 
involve the negligent provision of treatment which could cause physical injury, the 
patient is not foreseeably the victim of physical harm.
89
 This leans towards the 
conclusion that even if there is a breach of duty, there is seemingly no actionable 
damage because there does not appear to be a recognised head of damage. 
 
In addition, for different reasons than those canvassed in relation to battery, an 
action in negligence would again fail sufficiently to encapsulate the wrong that the 
doctor intentionally commits. As noted above, the tort can be applicable to intentional 
acts, however, negligence fails to frame the nature of the wrong appropriately (it 
frames it as a failure to meet the requisite standard of care rather than deliberate 
wrongdoing). For what seems to make the wrong done to the patient especially 
grievous in Type 2 cases is the knowing breach of trust and the doctor’s placing of 
himself in a position where his duty to the patient and his own self-interest conflict. 
 
 
IV. A BETTER APPROACH: RECOGNISING FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 
IN TYPE 2 CASES GROUNDED IN THE DOCTOR’S PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES  
 
... a physician takes the power which a patient normally has over her body, and 
which she cedes to him for purposes of treatment. The physician is pledged by 
the nature of his calling to use the power the patient cedes to him exclusively for 




The fiduciary analysis has a significant tactical advantage for the plaintiff 
because consent is not a defence… [it] has the ability to capture the dynamics of 




I now turn to present my argument that English law would offer a more apposite 
forum for dealing with a doctor’s breach of the sexual boundaries in Type 2 cases if 
the doctor’s violation of trust were to attract fiduciary liability in this jurisdiction. As I 
will demonstrate, this fiducial duty can be grounded in the doctor’s professional 
responsibilities not to breach trust and to act in the patient’s (best) interests rather than 
his own self-interest.  
 
‘Of ancient pedigree, and somewhat shrouded in mystery’,92 fiducial obligations 
arise in equity in relationships that have been recognised as fiduciary, such as that 
                                                 
88
 Whilst Lord Lloyd stated in Page v Smith [1996] AC 155, at 190  that ‘[o]nce it is established that 
the defendant is under a duty of care to avoid causing personal injury to the [claimant], it matters not 
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89
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90
 Norberg v Wynrib (n 45) [98], per McLachlin J (emphasis added). 
91
 P Peppin, ‘A Feminist Challenge to Tort Law’, in A Bottomley (ed), Feminist Perspectives on the 
Foundational Subjects of Law (Routledge Cavendish: London 1996) 82. 
92
 Kennedy (n 77) 120. 
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between trustee and beneficiary,
93
 and director and company, in circumstances where 
one party (the fiduciary) is entrusted with a power related to the beneficiary’s legal or 
practical interests. The interests in question will often be regarding property or 
confidential information and the power vested in the fiduciary is limited to acting on 
the beneficiary’s behalf ‘exclusively for the other-regarding purposes for which it is 
held’.94 As noted by Grubb, however, providing a comprehensive definition of a 
fiduciary relationship is ‘well nigh impossible’.95 Indeed, Flannigan has critiqued the 
law of fiduciary accountability for its lack of clarity and consistency, while Miller has 
observed that ‘the law has evolved absent a general theory of liability... [n]owhere is 
fiduciary liability principled.’96 Judges have centred their attention, on different 
occasions and in various jurisdictions, on elements of power, vulnerability and 
reliance, and tests based on discretion and reasonable expectation when finding that 
fiduciary duties exist.
97
 Moreover, Flannigan contends that confusion is exacerbated 
by the common allusion to fiduciary relationships because fiduciary ‘relationships’, as 
such, do not exist.
98
 Rather, following his analysis, fiduciary accountability arises 
where access to a person’s assets (or, in the context of this paper, access to the 
patient) occurs as a result of an undertaking to act in the person’s interest (an other-
regarding purpose).
99
 Such accountability is imposed, therefore, to control 
opportunism.
100
 Whilst Flannigan’s scholarship brings the basis for recognising 
fiduciary obligations more sharply into focus, the jurisprudence in the area has not 
moved away from the vaguer, conventional language of fiduciary relationships.
101
 
Yet, as I will argue later, there are compelling reasons for resisting the construal of 
the doctor-patient relationship as fiduciary in an all-encompassing way. 
 
Before addressing this issue, for my argument that fiduciary obligations should be 
recognised in Type 2 breaches of sexual boundaries cases to have any chance of 
succeeding, I must first find a means of overcoming a seemingly major hurdle: the 
fact that our courts may be unwilling to find fiduciary obligations in the doctor-patient 
relationship in contrast to Commonwealth courts elsewhere.
102
 Significantly, the 
                                                 
93
 P Bartlett, ‘Doctors as Fiduciaries: Equitable Regulation of the Doctor-Patient Relationship’ (1997) 5 
Med. L. R. 193, 195. 
94
 E Fox-decent and E Criddle, ‘The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights’ (2009) 15 LT 301, 312. 
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nineteenth century Court of Appeal case of Mitchell v Homfray
103
 suggests that such 
obligations could be found in the doctor-patient relationship. The case involved a gift 
made to Homfray, who had previously been the deceased’s doctor. The question arose 
as to whether Homfray’s ‘standing in a confidential relation to the donor’ made the 
gift impeachable.
104
 Since there was no suggestion of undue influence or fraud, it was 
held that whilst the gift was originally voidable, because the deceased had elected to 
abide by it and the doctor-patient relationship had ended, the gift could not be 
impeached. The court drew analogies with the way in which the influence that can be 
exacted in the solicitor-client relationship may make a gift invalid in equity.
105
 Whilst 
the term fiduciary is not actually used by the judges, they presented the doctor-patient 
relationship as a ‘confidential relation’,106 which is unsurprising given that abuse of a 
confidential relation was the more common terminology historically employed to 




According to the academic literature, it would seem that the courts in this 
jurisdiction viewed the doctor-patient relationship as ‘an epitome of the fiduciary 
relationship well into [the twentieth] century’.108 More recently, Browne-Wilkinson 
LJ clearly (albeit implicitly) acknowledged the existence of a fiduciary obligation in 
the doctor-patient relationship in the Court of Appeal judgment in the Sidaway case 
when he opined that such a duty might be breached where a doctor ‘abused his 
position of trust to make a personal profit for himself’.109 However, in the same court, 
Dunn LJ considered that only an ‘ill founded’ analogy could be drawn between the 
law of fiduciary obligations and a doctor’s performance of professional duties110 and, 
on appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Scarman rejected an attempt to present broadly 
the doctor-patient relationship as fiduciary in an in obiter statement. In his view, 
‘there is no comparison to be made between the relationship of doctor and patient 
with that of solicitor and client, trustee and cestui qui trust or the other relationships 
treated in equity as of a fiduciary character’.111  
 
This judicial reluctance to connect fiduciary law with the doctor-patient 
relationship can be explained in part because English law has tended to view the 
concept of fiduciary relationship as a function of property law and equitable 
limitations on ownership.
112
 It comes into play, therefore, as the mechanism for 
controlling the abuse of property improperly obtained from relationships of trust and, 
as such, the concept primarily denotes a relationship with the property and/or 
economic interest rather than with the person.
113
 The approach I will now advocate 
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may thus require a judicial willingness to move away from a conceptualisation of 
fiduciary law which is concerned primarily with property and economic interests
114
 in 
relationships of trust to one which imposes fiducial obligations to protect other non-
material interests in such relationships. Reiterating the underlying objective of 
controlling opportunism could well assist in encouraging such a move since, as Smith 
has recently argued, ‘[s]ituations in which the potential for opportunism arise out of 
an important discretionary agency relationship of great dependence are not limited to 
ones involving a conventional property interest or other identifiable resource. Thus, 
the treatment of physicians as fiduciaries is understandable…’115 I now draw attention 
to the reasons why the doctor-patient relationship is conducive to the recognition of 
fiduciary obligations and the protection of non-material interests, and then explain 
why this should be limited (initially, at least) to the particular context of sexual 
boundary breaches.  
 
Doctors epitomise what Moline has referred to as our paradigm professionals, 
individuals who act for the good of their clients, who are committed to take the trust 
placed in them seriously.
116
 Trustworthiness is one of the five virtues which 
Beauchamp and Childress consider to be particularly applicable to the medical 
professional and profession.
117
 The professional and ethical obligations to avoid an 
abuse of trust and power and to act in the patient’s best interests rather than the 
professional’s own self-interest, essential elements of the fiduciary duty,118 are 
fundamental to the requirement we place on doctors to uphold the reputation of the 
medical profession. Further, outwith the legal definition, a popular dictionary 
definition of fiduciary as ‘held or given in trust’ and ‘dependent on public trust’ can 
support the idea of the professional relationship between doctor and patient 
possessing such fiduciary characteristics by its focus on the private and public nature 
of the trust vested in the individual who owes the obligations.
119
 In both the private 
context (the trust the patient places in her doctor) and public context (upholding the 
public’s trust in the profession),120 the doctor-patient relationship is one in which, to 
use Harding’s phrasing, a ‘thicker form of trust’ arises because of the doctor 
occupying ‘a role to which specific social meanings and expectations attach’.121 
 
It is possible to see the way in which these professional responsibilities and the 
social expectations we have of medical professionals can be translated into a legal 
fiduciary obligation by returning to Norberg v Wynrib. The final claim that Laura 
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Norberg brought against Dr Wynrib was for breach of a fiduciary duty and in this 
respect her counsel convinced McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. As recently argued 
by Chamberlain, the case provides an illustration of the way in which, at least in the 
context of these two judgments, ‘… the Supreme Court of Canada is simply less 
timorous than its counterparts elsewhere in the common law world, and has been 
willing to apply the spirit of fiduciary obligation in ways that appropriately meet the 
perceived needs of modern society.’ Chamberlain proceeds to point out that protecting 
relationships considered valuable by society is a traditional rationale for recognising 
fiduciary obligations.
122
 Indeed, according to McLachlin J: 
 
… the doctor-patient relationship shares the peculiar hallmark of the fiduciary 
relationship – trust, the trust of a person with inferior power that another person 
who has assumed superior power and responsibility will exercise that power for 




McLachlin J. continued by highlighting societal and personal interests reflected in the 
case, which she found constituted vital practical interests that the legal enforcement of 
fiduciary duties was designed to protect: 
 
Society has an abiding interest in ensuring that the power entrusted to 
physicians by us, both collectively and individually, [should] not be used in 
corrupt ways… the plaintiff… has a striking personal interest in obtaining 





Although she acknowledged that these interests differed from the legal and economic 
interests which the law regarding fiduciary relationships traditionally protected, in her 
view, it would be wrong for the law to protect material interests whilst failing to 
protect human or personal interests.
125
 She offered no definition of what constitutes 
such interests, however it appears clear from the quotation above that she had in mind 
the interest all patients have in placing their trust in the medical profession to receive 
medical care and treatment without exploitation. A broader interpretation moving 
beyond sexual or other forms of
126
 exploitation would be that patients have an interest 
in obtaining medical care and treatment from doctors whose primary concern, and 
whose responsibility, is to protect their patients’ interests rather than serving their 
own. This interpretation would, if accepted, lead to wider recognition of the doctor-
patient relationship as fiduciary with more far-reaching consequences, as I will 
discuss shortly. 
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So why, post Mitchell v Homfray and Browne-Wilkinson LJ’s speech in Sidaway, 
have the courts in this jurisdiction shied away from an extension of fiduciary law to 
such interests? First, the context in which there has been very limited judicial 
consideration of whether the doctor-patient relationship should be recognised as 
fiduciary may be significant. Sidaway concerned a failure to inform the patient of 
inherent risks involved in a particular medical procedure. Notably, there is a degree of 
commonality between this context in which Lord Scarman refused to expand 
fiduciary law to doctors, and Type 2 sexual boundary breaches. The doctor’s 
behaviour in both instances leads us to question the genuineness of the patient’s 
consent and we consider the doctor’s behaviour to be inappropriate, a violation of the 
trust that the patient has placed in him. There may be a failure to refrain from acting 
out of self-interest
127
 and to protect the patient’s interests in both contexts.128  
 
There are, however, a number of important differences.
129
 First, the duty to 
disclose risks involved in a procedure relates to professional skill and thus an action in 
negligence is more apt. The duty in question would need to be the doctor’s duty to 
disclose personal interests in order for there to be a fit with fiduciary obligations.
130
 
Secondly, and related to this, negligence provides an avenue for redress for the non-
disclosure of risks, now well recognised by the courts, and it is thus unnecessary to 
offer the patient a remedy through extending fiduciary law to encompass this 
scenario. By contrast, as I have argued above, the existing law fails to offer a neat or 
obvious fit for doctors’ Type 2 sexual boundary breaches; a legal remedy under tort 
law does not clearly exist. Consequently, applying the law of fiduciary obligations 
would ‘[complement] the laws of contract, tort, and unjust enrichment, and [offer] a 
meaningful, alternative cause of action for interactions that create implicit 
dependency and peculiar vulnerability’ where other causes of action fail to bite.131 
Thirdly, a failure to inform a patient of inherent risks can be the result of a doctor’s 
negligence rather than an intentional omission, whereas Type 2 breaches of sexual 
boundaries are always intentional. Whilst I note that a breach of a fiduciary duty may 
be entirely innocent,
132
 the fiduciary obligation that I am calling to be recognised 
relates to deliberate wrongdoing. Finally, the underlying mischief of opportunism that 
the law of fiduciary obligations seeks to address is present in Type 2 sexual boundary 
breaches, whereas it is absent in (most) cases where the doctor fails to disclose 
risks.
133
 As has been noted in another context, ‘[b]reach of fiduciary obligation… 
connotes disloyalty or infidelity. Mere incompetence is not enough’.134 All of these 
differences could justify a more sympathetic judicial response to a claim that the law 
of fiduciary obligations should apply initially in the specific context of a doctor’s 
sexual exploitation of his patient. 
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Perhaps our judges are concerned that broader recognition of the doctor-patient 
relationship as fiduciary could give rise to attempts to extend the application of the 
law of equity to numerous other doctor-patient contexts, such as failing to allow a 
patient access to her medical records. If the law were to reflect the position that the 
doctor-patient relationship is, broadly speaking, a fiduciary one, it would take a 
status-based approach
135
 to finding fiduciary obligations. Problematically and 
unnecessarily, this would extend the remit of fiduciary law to all areas of a doctor’s 
interaction with a patient, making it both unwieldy and over-broad. A reluctance to 
see all of a doctor’s obligations as fiducial rather than confining a doctor’s potential 
fiduciary accountability to more limited contexts was clear in the High Court of 
Australia case of Breen v Williams.
136
 And, as has been noted in a Canadian case, ‘not 
all fiduciary relationships and not all fiduciary obligations are the same; these are 
shaped by the demands of the situation. A relationship may properly be described as 
“fiduciary” for some purposes, but not for others.’137 Thus, again, the courts may be 
more receptive to recognising the doctor-patient relationship as a fiduciary one if this 
were to occur in the particular context of sexual boundary violations, thereby 
reflecting a fact-based approach to finding fiduciary obligations that does not create 
the broader precedent set by a status-based approach.
138
 This is not to suggest that the 
application of fiduciary obligations should remain limited to sexual boundary 
breaches. An initial application to such breaches may help quell judicial reluctance to 
accept fiduciary obligations in the doctor-patient relationship, but once this first step 
has been taken, the judiciary may be amenable to incremental expansion to 
encompass other forms of exploitation such as the confluence of medicine with 




The argument that fiduciary obligations to patients should be limited to 
circumstances involving exploitation gains additional strength on the basis of 
Flannigan’s analysis of the essential characteristic of fiduciary obligations. His 
detailed critical exploration of the Anglo-American and Australian jurisprudence has 
led him to argue that the courts have become confused as to the fundamental 
prohibition that a fiduciary obligation contains: not to act out of self-interest.
140
 This 
would exclude any behaviour absent such self-interest (such as failure to inform the 
patient of risks because the doctor considers the risks to be negligible, refusal to grant 
patients access to their medical records, or the breaching of confidentiality in order to 
protect others
141
) from the purview of fiduciary law. It would also be in keeping with 
Meagher JA’s view in the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in Breen v 
Williams that the type of fiduciary duties which would usually occur in the doctor-
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patient relationship are for doctors not to profit at their patients’ expense142 and not to 




I am thus advocating the adoption of a liberal approach to finding fiduciary 
obligations which draws upon the moral and social purposes fiduciary law can serve 
and utilises fiduciary law as an instrument of public policy,
144
 as has occurred in the 
Canadian jurisprudence. For it is fiduciary law that most appropriately captures the 
elements in the doctor’s behaviour in Type 2 cases that make the wrong and harm 
committed so egregious: the doctor allows a conflict between his duty of loyalty to the 
patient and his own self-interest to arise, gaining from the exploitation of his more 
powerful position and breach of trust. Fundamentally, the wrong is committed 
through allowing this conflict to arise
145
 and this is what makes fiduciary law so 
apposite; whilst the afore-discussed action for battery might reflect the wrongful 
aspect of the doctor’s exploitation of his more powerful position to acquire ostensible 
consent, it would not capture this essential element of the wrong. The broader moral 
lens incorporated by the law of fiduciary obligations and equity more broadly should 
be conducive to recognising the ‘totality’146 of this deliberate wrongful and harmful 
behaviour.
147
 My position here is predicated on loyalty being an essential ingredient 
of fiduciary law, as Gold and Miller have recognised: ‘[t]he duty of loyalty is one of 
the most prominent features of fiduciary law’.148 Whilst I acknowledge that there is 
debate as to whether the fiduciary obligation to avoid a conflict between one’s duty 
and one’s personal interest is grounded in morality,149 the argument that the origins of 




Finally, I should address the issue of when a breach of the sexual boundaries in 
Type 2 cases should be actionable under fiduciary law and the matter of remedies. 
Should it be necessary to require that the breach cause a recognised psychiatric 
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condition rather than (simply) mental distress? I argue that if a patient can establish 
that she suffered mental distress as a consequence of a breach in a Type 2 case, even 
if this does not lead to a psychiatric condition, this should constitute actionable 
damage. For, as Allen has observed, albeit in a broader context, ‘[t]he harm is real, 
even if it is not a psychiatric disorder’151 and in the context of a professional 
relationship so dependent on trust, the need to deter the abuse of power is clear.
152
 In 
terms of remedies, equitable compensation
153
 could redress the harm caused. I note 
that the question of whether exemplary damages in particular are available for breach 
of a fiduciary duty is unsettled under the law in England and Wales.
154
 Certainly in 
the breach of trust cases related to property and economic interests, it has been held 
that the issue of remedies should be settled by proprietary remedies (constructive trust 
principles) rather than awarding equitable compensation akin to exemplary 
damages.
155
 However, whilst noting ‘the absence of English authorities for awarding 
exemplary damages for an equitable wrong’, the Law Commission has recommended 
the use of punitive damages under fiduciary law.
156
 Commonwealth jurisdictions 
elsewhere do allow such awards to be made
157
 and, indeed, McLachlin J’s remedy for 
Laura Norberg included $25,000 in punitive damages for Dr Wynrib’s breach of his 
fiduciary duty. In explaining her reasoning behind the availability of punitive 
damages, she noted that where the fiduciary’s behaviour is purposefully repugnant to 
the beneficiary’s best interests and motivated by self-interest, this would establish the 
conditions precedent for awarding punitive damages in fiduciary law.
158
 She also 




The award of exemplary damages in that case has been supported by Duggan,
160
 
and such an award would offer an apt remedy in other Type 2 breaches if permitted in 
this jurisdiction. Indeed, equitable compensation offers a superior method of redress 
when compared to battery or negligence since it is better able to address the public 
policy concerns that Type 2 sexual boundary breaches raise. Tan has noted the 
‘flexibility of equitable compensation’ to provide an appropriate award that takes into 
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account the nature of the fiduciary obligation that has been breached and the 
particular circumstances of the case.
161
 Referring to precedent in Norberg v Wynrib, 
McLachlin J stated that ‘… equitable compensation, must continue to… be moulded 
to meet the requirements of fairness and justice in specific situations’162 and ‘[i]n 
awarding damages the same generous, restorative remedial approach, which stems 
from the nature of the obligation in equity, applies.’163 She thereby differentiated 
equitable compensation from damages in contract and tort which would take account 
of any failure on the part of the claimant to mitigate or take appropriate care, 
emphasising equity’s concern to restore the claimant as fully as possible to the 
position she would have been in had the breach not occurred.  
 
Thus, the flexibility of equitable compensation should enable recognition and 
remediation of the harm done to the trust placed in the doctor by the patient and 
collectively by society in the medical profession, alongside any psychological injury 
and mental distress suffered by the patient. As put by Joyce, ‘[f]undamentally… the 
benefit of applying fiduciary law… [lies] in the appropriate acknowledgement in law 
of the wrong done to the [patient]’.164 
 
Having made my case for the recognition of fiduciary duties in the context of 
Type 2 breaches of the sexual boundaries, I now consider how this fits with the 




V. SYNTHESISING THE FIDUCIARY APPROACH WITH THE 
CONTEMPORARY MODEL OF THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 
 
I have argued that the fiduciary approach is grounded in the particular professional 
responsibilities to avoid an abuse of trust and power and to avoid a conflict arising 
between the duty to act in the patient’s interests and the doctor’s own self-interest.165 
However, fiduciary law’s emphasis on power and dependency has caused Peppin to 
question whether it can fit comfortably with the current model of the doctor-patient 
relationship which prioritises patient autonomy rather than physician paternalism.
166
 
This prioritisation in ethics and law
167
 suggests that today’s patient is less dependent 
and more empowered, and therefore, less reliant than the beneficiary in a fiducial 
relationship. Moreover, for some patients, knowing that their doctor is legally obliged 
to respect their autonomy could also diminish (although not extinguish) the need for 
trust in the relationship, thereby calling into question the existence of an element so 
fundamental to fiduciary obligations. 
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Prioritisation of the patient’s autonomy can only go so far, however. The doctor’s 
obligations to act in the patient’s best interests and consider appropriate treatment 
options remain, as does the patient’s reliance on the doctor’s expertise and her 
obligation to engage in responsible decision-making
168
 with her doctor. This is 
evidenced by considering another established model of the doctor-patient relationship 
which overarches the patient autonomy model: the mutuality, or shared decision-
making model.
169
 This model is ‘characterized by the active involvement of patients 
as more equal partners in the consultation... in which both parties participate as a joint 
venture and engage in an exchange of ideas and sharing of belief systems’.170 The 
information provided by the doctor is technical and medical, the patient’s relates to 
her preferences, values, and plans.
171
 As this model reveals, decisions as to the 
patient’s treatment and care must be made within the framework of the medical 
evidence. The mutuality model sets the boundaries of the patient autonomy model, 
favouring principled autonomy, a concept that focuses on responsibilities and 
obligations to others,
172
 over individual autonomy. Significantly, trust is a vital 
component of the mutuality model.
173
 Put simply, without trust, neither party will feel 
able to engage in the necessary exchange of ideas.  
 
My synthesis of the mutuality model and a fiduciary approach to doctors 
breaching the sexual boundaries can essentially be expressed in the following way: 
the patient approaches the doctor for medical advice/treatment; her engagement with 
the doctor occurs with a view to gaining advice/treatment in her interests and she 
enters into the relationship with him on the basis that he can be trusted not to act 
primarily out of self-interest and to respect her autonomy and values. Because of the 
mutuality of the relationship and the need to respect the patient’s autonomy, the 
doctor makes a fiduciary undertaking when entering into a professional relationship 
with the patient and the patient’s acquiescence to being involved in this relationship 
and engaging in the shared venture of responsible decision-making is given on this 
(implicit) basis. A doctor who proceeds to breach the sexual boundaries has not only 
violated the patient’s trust, he has also failed to respect the mutuality of the doctor-
relationship, treating the patient not as an autonomous partner but as a means to 
achieve his own self-interest. Or, to put it another way, the doctor’s exploitation of the 
patient for reasons of self-interest prevents the existence of a relationship of mutuality 
and this is thus a further reason to take a breach of a fiduciary obligation seriously. It 
is therefore possible to address Peppin’s concern through the lens of the mutuality 
doctor-patient relationship model. For, as Harding has argued, fiduciary law assists in 
‘building a trusting relationship as a normative framework for cooperative action’, 
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The reported cases and existing research related to doctors behaving in a sexualised 
way towards their patients demonstrate that sexual boundary breaches continue to 
occur despite the clear professional ethical prohibition placed on such conduct. I have 
placed the various types of boundary violations into three categories, primarily on the 
basis of the absence of patient consent (Type 1 breaches involving criminal offences); 
the presence of the element of inducement which can cause us to question how real a 
patient’s consent is (Type 2 breaches); and the presence of patient consent absent such 
an element (Type 3 breaches). Whilst all of these breaches involve a breach of trust, 
Type 1 and 2 breaches are sufficiently wrongful and harmful to warrant bringing the 
doctor to account at law.  
 
Type 1 breaches fall within the realm of the criminal law, however, Type 2 
breaches are not always clearly caught by the existing law because of the difficulties 
associated with proving a lack of consent. Moreover, the possible available avenues 
for legal redress under the law of torts fail to capture the essence of the wrong 
committed; the abuse of trust and power which occurs because the doctor has allowed 
a conflict to arise between his duty and self-interest. Consequently, I have argued that 
English law should recognise fiduciary obligations in the doctor-patient relationship 
in this specific context. For, ‘[w]ithout characterizing the duty as fiduciary the wrong 
done to the patient [can] neither be fully comprehended in law nor adequately 
compensated in damages.’175 The duty upon physicians to maintain the sexual 
boundaries with their patients reflects the essence of fiduciary obligations; the doctor 
who breaches this duty abuses his position of trust for self-gain, failing to put the 
patient’s interests first. Whilst I have suggested that the initial move to recognise 
fiduciary obligations in relation to Type 2 boundary breaches could then be expanded 
to encompass other instances of exploitation which the doctor perpetrates for reasons 
of self-interest, I have not advocated extending recognition of fiduciary obligations in 
the doctor-patient relationship beyond such exploitative contexts. I do not see this as 
necessary or, indeed, appropriate when other more suitable legal remedies exist for 
behaviour such as refusing to allow a patient access to her medical records, or 
breaching a patient’s confidentiality.  
 
I have shown that the fiduciary approach I have called for in Type 2 cases is not 
at odds with the prominence attached to patient autonomy in the contemporary doctor-
patient relationship, demonstrating how viewing the doctor as fiduciary reflects the 
nature of the interaction between doctor and patient under the mutuality model of this 
relationship. The patient’s relationship with her doctor involves a responsible, shared 
decision-making process regarding her health. She engages with her doctor in order to 
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gain advice and treatment in her interests on the basis that he can be trusted not to act 
out of self-interest and to respect her as a partner in this process. Ensuring that any 
conflict between his duty to the patient and his self-interest is avoided is fundamental 
to discharging his ethical responsibilities as a medical professional, including 
respecting the patient as an autonomous partner. The fiduciary approach is thus well 
suited to supporting and protecting a relationship grounded in trust in which both 
parties express their autonomy by working cooperatively together. 
 
 
 
